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Tort litigation against the Catholic Church is largely 
responsible for the widespread understanding of clergy sexual 
abuse as an institutional failure on the part of Church officials.1
 
       †  Albert and Angela Farone Distinguished Professor of Law, Albany Law 
School.  This essay is based on a presentation delivered at a childhood sexual 
abuse conference on April 24, 2009, at William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul, 
Minnesota.  I am grateful to Professor Phebe Haugen for inviting me to participate 
in the conference and this symposium issue.   
  I 
have argued elsewhere that by framing clergy sexual abuse in terms 
of institutional failure, uncovering information about the nature 
and scope of the problem, and placing it on the agendas of Church 
       1.   Portions of this essay were previously published in Timothy D. Lytton, 
Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation: The Policymaking Role of Tort Law, 39 CONN. L. REV. 809 
(2007) [hereinafter Lytton, Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation] and Timothy D. Lytton, 
Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policymaking: Evaluating Climate-Change 
Litigation in Light of Lessons from Gun-Industry and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 1837 (2008) [hereinafter Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance 
Regulatory Policymaking].  For a more complete analysis of how tort litigation 
enhanced policymaking responses to clergy sexual abuse, see TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, 
HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: HOW LAWSUITS HELPED THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE (2008) [hereinafter LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS 
ACCOUNTABLE]. 
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leaders and government officials, tort litigation enhanced 
policymaking efforts to address the problem.2  This essay focuses on 
three features of tort litigation that explain why it exerted such a 
powerful influence on the framing of clergy sexual abuse.  In the 
interest of brevity, I offer only a summary analysis and provide 
examples of the types of empirical evidence that illustrate this 
influence.3  I begin with a brief introduction to several leading 
clergy sexual abuse cases that I will draw upon in the analysis that 
follows,4 and I end with a brief discussion of two implications of the 
analysis, one for the current controversy over tort reform and the 
other for our understanding of child sexual abuse in institutional 
settings.5
I. BACKGROUND: THREE LEADING CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 
 
Clergy sexual abuse litigation includes thousands of lawsuits 
across the country, spanning more than twenty-five years from the 
mid-1980s to the present.  I will focus here on three cases that 
individually played significant roles within the history of clergy 
sexual abuse litigation and that can be used to illustrate the 
influence of this litigation on the framing of clergy sexual abuse.6
In the summer of 1983, it came to light that Father Gilbert 
Gauthe had sexually abused dozens of children in a small parish 
near Lafayette, Louisiana, where he served as the local priest.
 
7  One 
family—the Gastals—refused the diocese’s offer of a confidential 
settlement and, wanting to speak out publicly, filed suit against 
Gauthe and his superiors in 1984.8  Alleging theories of respondeat 
superior and negligent supervision, the Gastals won a $1.25 million 
verdict against the diocese.9
 
 2. See generally LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE, supra note 1; Lytton, 
Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policymaking, supra note 1. 
  The diocese appealed, and the parties 
 3. For a more comprehensive analysis and more extensive evidence, see 
LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE, supra note 1, at 82–107. 
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. For a more complete history, see LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS 
ACCOUNTABLE, supra note 1, at 14–40.  See also LEON J. PODLES, SACRILEGE: SEXUAL 
ABUSE IN THE CHURCH (2008) (exploring the deep roots of sexual-abuse in the 
Catholic Church). 
 7. JASON BERRY, LEAD US NOT INTO TEMPTATION: CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND THE 
SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 14–15 (1992). 
 8. Id. at 23–26. 
 9. Petition for Damages ¶ 21–22, Gastal v. Hannan, No. 84-48175 (La. 15th 
Dist. June 27, 1984) (on file with Author); BERRY, supra note 7, at 163.  
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eventually settled for $1 million.10
“Prior to the Gauthe case, incidents of clergy sexual abuse 
were viewed as rare and isolated occurrences, and they attracted 
limited local press coverage or, more often, no press coverage at 
all.”
 
11  The Gastals’ civil suit against Gauthe and the Diocese of 
Lafayette was the first case of clergy sexual abuse to attract national 
attention and, in conjunction with concurrent cases around the 
country, the suit created the impression of a pervasive, nationwide 
problem.12  The Gauthe litigation inspired victims around the 
country to come forward and, in increasing numbers, to file 
lawsuits.13  It also caught the attention of bishops, who began for 
the first time as a group to discuss the problem and explore ways to 
address it.14
In 1992, the Diocese of Fall River, Massachusetts, settled claims 
of sexual abuse by Father James Porter with sixty-eight victims for 
an undisclosed sum, reported in The Boston Globe as “at least $5 
million.”
 
15  To date, this was the largest group settlement of sexual 
abuse claims against the Church.16  But it was not the end of the 
story.  The diocese subsequently settled another thirty-three claims 
for undisclosed sums.17  The total number of Porter’s victims is 
estimated at well over 100—some put the total closer to 200—
abused over a fourteen-year period from 1960 to 1974, in five 
parish assignments in Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, and 
Texas.18
The Porter case attracted widespread media attention, led to a 
dramatic increase in the number of victims willing to come 
 
 
 10. BERRY, supra note 7, at 168.  For a detailed account of the case, see BERRY, 
supra note 7, at 147–68; J. MINOS SIMON, LAW IN THE CAJUN NATION 134–63 (1993). 
 11. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE, supra note 1, at 13. 
 12. See id. at 14. 
 13. See id. at 15–18 (chanceries received 328 abuse reports in the five years 
prior to the Gauthe litigation and 817 abuse reports in the five years following 
Gauthe); see also id. at 49-54 (showing empirical evidence of a dramatic increase in 
such lawsuits after 1984). 
 14. Id. at 14–17.  
 15. Stephen Kurkjian, 68 Victims Settle Porter Case with Catholic Church, THE 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 1992, at 1.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Survivor Connections, Frank L. Fitzpatrick vs. ex-priest James R. Porter 
Brief Chronology, through 1993, http://survivorconnections/flfvsporter.html (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2009).  
 18. These and other details of the case can be found in ELINOR BURKETT & 
FRANK BRUNI, A GOSPEL OF SHAME: CHILDREN, SEXUAL ABUSE, AND THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH 8–9, 14, 17–18, 20–21, 23–24 (1993).  
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forward, and stimulated further litigation against the Church. 
Parallels with the Gauthe case were inescapable.  The Porter affair 
fueled perceptions among victims and plaintiffs’ attorneys of “an 
organized conspiracy among the bishops to protect child molesters 
and to conceal the widespread problem of clergy sexual abuse 
within the Church.19  For their part, Church officials pledged to 
formulate more effective policies to prevent child sexual abuse by 
clergy and to respond more openly when it occurred.20
In 2002, litigation against the Boston archdiocese for sexual 
abuse committed by Father John Geoghan became a symbol for the 
clergy sexual abuse scandal.  The archdiocese had quietly settled 
the claims of over fifty of Geoghan’s victims in the late 1990s for 
over $10 million.
 
21  In 2002, the archdiocese entered into a highly 
publicized settlement with an additional eighty-six victims for 
another $10 million.22
What distinguished the Geoghan case from its predecessors 
was the astounding scope of the abuse and the cover-up.  In the 
end, 200 Geoghan victims, molested over a thirty-three year period, 
filed claims, and experts estimate that the total number of 
Geoghan’s victims could be as high as 800.
 
23  Diocesan personnel 
files show that Church officials were aware of Geoghan’s 
misconduct, failed to report it or notify parishioners, and 
repeatedly reassigned him to positions where he would have access 
to children.24  The cover up implicated no fewer than six bishops 
and ultimately forced Cardinal Bernard Law, the highly influential 
Archbishop of Boston, to step down and seek refuge in Rome.25  
“The wave of litigation initiated by the Geoghan affair turned out 
to be a tidal wave that swept the country from Boston to Los 
Angeles.”26
 
 19. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE, supra note 1, at 25.   
 
 20. Id. at 24–25. 
 21. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policymaking, supra note 
1, at 1851.   
 22. Walter V. Robinson, Diocese, Plaintiffs Settle Suit: 86 Geoghan Cases to Cost up 
to $30M, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 2002, at A1; Walter V. Robinson & Michael 
Rezendez, Geoghan Victims Agree to $10M Settlement, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 
2002, at A1. 
 23. THE INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN 
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 6, 14–16, 19, 22, 23, 27 (2002). 
 24. Id. at x, 3, 8, 14, 23, 26.  
 25. Id. at x, 3, 14, 22, 24.  
 26. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policymaking, supra note 
1, at 1851. 
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II. EXPLAINING THE INFLUENCE OF TORT LITIGATION ON THE 
FRAMING OF CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE 
Since the Gauthe case, different parties have attempted to 
frame clergy sexual abuse within the Catholic Church in a variety of 
ways.27
• Blame the priest: Clergy sexual abuse is a matter of individual 
culpability on the part of a few “bad apples” within the 
priesthood. 
  These include:  
• Blame the press: Anti-Catholic media bias has unfairly singled out 
the Catholic Church for coverage of child sexual abuse, which 
is just as or more prevalent in other institutions, such as schools 
and youth programs. 
• Blame the legal system: The problem of clergy sexual abuse has 
been blown out of proportion by money-hungry plaintiffs’ 
attorneys who file suit in order to profit from the misfortunes of 
their clients and by defense attorneys who advised bishops to 
deny legitimate abuse allegations for fear of liability exposure 
and aggressively defend tort claims instead of settling them. 
• Blame the parents: The parents of abuse victims are to blame for 
entrusting their children to the care of priests about whom they 
did not know enough and for re-victimizing their children by 
dragging them through the litigation process. 
• Blame the dominant culture: An over-sexed popular culture and 
tolerance of homosexuality within the Church have corroded 
the moral teachings of the Church and undermined clerical 
celibacy. 
• Blame the bishops: The real problem is not so much the 
occurrence of sexual abuse by priests but rather the widespread 
and systematic failure of Catholic Church officials to properly 
investigate allegations of child sexual abuse, to report credible 
allegations to criminal justice authorities, and to remove from 
ministry priests whom they knew posed a threat to children. 
 
The last of these—the frame of institutional failure on the part 
of bishops—was advanced by plaintiffs’ attorneys in lawsuits against 
the Church.28
 
 27. For a more detailed account of the alternative frames for clergy sexual 
abuse, see Lytton, Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation, supra note 1, at 841–47 and 
LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE, supra note 1, at 101–06. 
  It became the dominant understanding of clergy 
 28. See Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policy Making, supra 
note 1, at 1853–57. 
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sexual abuse within the Church among the public and 
policymakers because it was adopted by the news media.29
A. Correspondence between the Strategic Considerations that Shape Tort 
Claims and the Criteria of Newsworthiness 
  Clergy 
sexual abuse illustrates in a particularly clear manner how tort 
litigation can influence media framing of an issue.  I will focus on 
three features of tort litigation that explain this influence. 
The influence of tort litigation on media framing can be 
explained in part by the close correspondence between the 
strategic considerations that shape the framing of tort claims and 
the criteria of newsworthiness upon which journalists rely in 
constructing news that will attract a large audience.  Consider first 
the framing of tort claims.  Most tort causes of action require that 
plaintiffs frame their claims in terms of injury caused by 
wrongdoing.  The need to convince judges and jurors of the claim’s 
merit leads plaintiffs to dramatize this basic narrative structure as a 
morality tale about right and wrong.30  In addition, the value of 
plaintiffs’ claims are enhanced by portraying injuries as severe and 
wrongdoing as egregious, and one’s chances of recovery are 
increased by naming defendants capable of satisfying judgments, 
who are often well-known figures or institutions.31
News reporting, like filing a tort claim, is also an act of 
framing.
  Thus, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys frequently frame claims in terms of the familiar story of 




 29. Media scholars have suggested that media coverage of an issue offers a 
proxy for public awareness of and concern about an issue.  See SHANTO IYENGAR & 
DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS: TELEVISION AND AMERICAN OPINION 16 
(1987); John Bohte et al., One Voice Among Many: The Supreme Court’s Influence on 
Attentiveness to Issues in the United States, 1947–1992, in LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING 
THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE 23–24 (David A. Schultz ed., 1998).  Based 
on these studies, I assume for the purposes of this analysis that media coverage 
both influences and reflects the way that issues are framed by the public and 
policymakers. 
  Reporters, editors, publishers, and broadcasters frame 
 30. See NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT 
ACCIDENTS 92 (2000) (explaining that jurors are attracted to conceptions of 
accidents that take the form of melodramas). 
 31. Lytton, Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation, supra note 1, at 820.  
 32. For an analysis of news as a frame, see TODD GITLIN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS 
WATCHING: MASS MEDIA IN THE MAKING & UNMAKING OF THE NEW LEFT 6–7, 49–51 
(1980); GAYE TUCHMAN, MAKING NEWS: A STUDY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 1, 
6
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events, issues, and people in order to create news stories that will 
attract an audience.  Journalists refer to such stories as being 
“newsworthy.”  A story is more likely to be considered newsworthy if 
it can be framed as a dramatic narrative that involves active 
characters and exciting events.33  The magnitude of an event and 
the extent of its impact also influence its newsworthiness.34  A 
narrative with clear implications and straightforward moral lessons 
is considered more newsworthy than a narrative open to many 
different interpretations.35  The news media favor stories that are 
set in frames that are culturally familiar to readers.36  The 
familiarity of the frame allows readers to understand and relate to a 
news story without the need for extensive background information.  
At the same time, a story that portrays the unexpected or unusual 
within familiar frames is considered more newsworthy.37  Events 
that are surprising attract more attention than those that are 
routine.  And finally, a story about elites or well-known figures is 
considered more newsworthy.38  Newsworkers use these criteria in 





 33. HERBERT J. GANS, DECIDING WHAT’S NEWS: A STUDY OF CBS EVENING NEWS, 
NBC NIGHTLY NEWS, NEWSWEEK, AND TIME 171–72 (25th anniv. ed. 2004); GITLIN, 
supra note 32, at 28; WILLIAM HALTOM, REPORTING ON THE COURTS: HOW THE MASS 
MEDIA COVER JUDICIAL ACTIONS 186–87 (1998); MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF NEWS 48, 178–79 (2003); Graham Murdock, Political Deviance: The 
Press Presentation of a Militant Mass Demonstration, in THE MANUFACTURE OF NEWS: 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS, DEVIANCE AND THE MASS MEDIA 165 (Stanley Cohen & Jock 
Young eds., 1973). 
 34. GANS, supra note 33, at 151; Johan Galtung & Mari Ruge, Structuring and 
Selecting News, in THE MANUFACTURE OF NEWS: SOCIAL PROBLEMS, DEVIANCE AND THE 
MASS MEDIA 54 (Stanley Cohen & Jock Young eds., rev. ed. 1981). 
 35. Galtung & Ruge, supra note 34, at 54. 
 36. Id.; Murdock, supra note 33, at 164–65. 
 37. Galtung & Ruge, supra note 34, at 54.   
 38. Id. at 56. 
 39. Id. at 60–61. 
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Figure 1 
Strategic Considerations that 
Shape Tort Claims 
Criteria of  
Newsworthiness 
• Narrative of wrongdoing, 
causation & injury  
• Egregious wrongdoing & 
severe injury 
• Clear right & wrong 
• Familiar story  
• Well known or 
institutional defendants 
• Dramatic narrative 
• Magnitude 
• Clear moral lesson 
• Cultural familiarity 
• Elites 
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, there is a correspondence between the 
strategic considerations that shape the framing of tort claims and 
the criteria of newsworthiness upon which journalists rely in 
constructing the news.  This should come as no great surprise.  
After all, even though they work in very different institutional 
settings, both lawyers and journalists are in the business of 
constructing persuasive frames for audiences that include both 
elites and members of the general public. 
The Gauthe case offers a good example of this 
correspondence between litigation and news production.  In that 
case, the complaint named as defendants:  
Archbishop Philip M. Hannan; Bishop Gerald L. Frey; 
Vicar General Richard Von Puhl Mouton; Monsignor 
Harry E. Benefiel; Monsignor H. A. Larroque; The 
Archdiocese Of New Orleans, D/B/A The Roman 
Catholic Church; The Roman Catholic Church for the 
Diocese Of Lafayette; The Roman Catholic Church; St. 
John Parish Representing The Communities Of Esther 
And Henry, Vermillion Parish, Louisiana; Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London; Interstate Insurance 
Company, and Father Gilbert Gauthe. 
By listing first well-known Church officials and institutions, 
including “The Roman Catholic Church,” the title of the case 
began the process of framing the sexual abuse committed by 
Gauthe as an institutional failure.40
 
 40. Case file cover page, Gastal v. Interstate Ins. Co., No. 84-48175 (La. 15th 
Dist. Jun. 27, 1984) (on file with Author). 
  The complaint alleged that 
Gauthe “recruited, enticed and coerced numerous young children 
8
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of the congregation of the aforementioned Parishes to engage in 
sex initiation rings under the guise of religious initiation rites, 
training, and tutelage.”41  Against the background of highly 
publicized allegations around the country in the early 1980s of 
childcare workers running child sex rings and engaging in ritual 
child sex abuse,  these allegations would have sounded familiar to 
the judge as well as many, if not most, prospective jurors.42  The 
most detailed allegations were against Church officials, whom the 
plaintiffs asserted “made possible” the abuse by Gauthe by failing to 
remove him from ministry or inform parishioners even after the 
officials knew of his repeated sexual abuse of children.43  A 
supplemental complaint filed by plaintiffs’ attorney, J. Minos 
Simon, further alleged that  “[C]hurch officials made a studied 
effort to conceal and withhold . . . information concerning 
Gauthe’s misconduct from members and families of the 
[C]hurch,” and that Church officials, “having full knowledge . . . of 
his tendencies to sexually abuse young children,” moved him from 
one parish to another.  In doing so, Simon’s supplemental 
complaint concluded that Church officials “knowingly created an 
environment which operated to maximize opportunities for 
Gauthe to further wantonly sexually abuse innocent young 
children.”44  The complaint referred to Church officials as 
“corporate officers,” undermining feelings of personal allegiance 
to them and making the allegations sound like a typical story of 
corporate malfeasance and cover-up.45
Examples of media coverage of the Gauthe case reflect the 
media’s adoption of this frame of institutional failure.  In the first 
print coverage of the Gauthe litigation, published by a local weekly, 
  Thus, the plaintiffs’ 
complaint offers a culturally familiar dramatic narrative involving 
elites with a clear moral lesson—institutional cover-up by high-
ranking Church officials of ritual child sexual abuse. 
 
 41. Petition for Damages, supra note 9, ¶10. 
 42. DAVID HECHLER, THE BATTLE AND THE BACKLASH: THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
WAR xiii-xiv (1988) (on sex rings); PHILIP JENKINS, PEDOPHILES AND PRIESTS: 
ANATOMY OF A CONTEMPORARY CRISIS 141–42 (1996) (on ritual abuse).  See generally 
DEBBIE NATHAN & MICHAEL SNEDEKER, SATAN’S SILENCE: RITUAL ABUSE AND THE 
MAKING OF A MODERN AMERICAN WITCH HUNT (1995) (examining, analyzing, and 
discussing the childcare worker sex ring claims of the 1980s). 
 43. Petition for Damages, supra note 9, ¶ 23.   
 44. First Supplemental and Amended Petition ¶ 5, Gastal v. Hannan, No. 
84-48175-A (La. 15th Dist. Oct. 25, 1984) (on file with William Mitchell Law 
Review).   
 45. Petition for Damages, supra note 9, ¶ 23(l)–(m).   
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the Times of Acadiana in 1984, reporter Barry Yeoman asserted that 
“[t]he most interesting aspect of the Gauthe case stands to be the 
church’s role in the civil case.”46  The second print article, by 
reporter John Pope, appeared on the front page of the regional 
paper, the New Orleans Times-Picayune under the headline “Church 
Knew of Abuses, Sex Case Depositions Show.”47
[t]he tragedy, and scandal, as NCR sees it, is not only with 
the actions of the individual priests—these are serious 
enough—but with church structures in which bishops, 
chanceries and seminaries fail to respond to complaints, 
or even engage in cover-ups; sadly, keeping the affair 
quiet has usually assumed greater importance than any 
possible effect on the victims themselves.
  The first national 
coverage appeared in a front-page editorial in the National Catholic 
Reporter (NCR), which asserted that  
48
In all of these examples, media coverage emphasizes the 
primacy of institutional failure on the part of Church officials over 
the individual culpability of Gauthe.  The plaintiffs’ framing of 
clergy sexual abuse in the Gauthe case as a problem of institutional 
failure came to dominate local, regional, and national press 
coverage of the case and, eventually, the whole nationwide 
phenomenon of clergy sexual abuse. 
 
The focus on Church officials’ institutional responsibility 
rather than on the individual culpability of abusers remained a 
dominant theme in later media coverage.  For example, one of the 
first stories in The Boston Globe on the Porter case was entitled 
“Some Fault Church on Sex Abuse by Priests.”49  Television 
coverage of the Porter case also emphasized the frame of the 
Church’s institutional responsibility.  In February 1993, on ABC’s 
Nightline, host Ted Koppel introduced the broadcast by stating: 
“For years, the Church looked the other way.”50
 
 46. Barry Yeoman, Is Nothing Sacred?, TIMES OF ACADIANA, Nov. 1, 1984, at 21. 
  In March 1993, the 
CBS show 60 Minutes broadcast a segment on clergy sexual abuse in 
the Archdiocese of New Mexico under the title: “The Archbishop: 
 47. John Pope, Church Knew of Abuses, Sex Case Depositions Show, NEW ORLEANS 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 9, 1984, at A1.   
 48. Editorial, Priest child abuse cases victimizing families; bishops lack policy 
response, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Kansas City, MO), June 7, 1985, at 1, 4. 
 49. Alison Bass, Some Fault Church on Sex Abuse by Priests, THE BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 11, 1992, at 1. 
 50. Nightline: Child Sexual Abuse in the Catholic Church (ABC television 
broadcast Feb. 24, 1993). 
10
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Coverup by Roman Catholic Church of Pedophilia by its Priests.”51
The frame of institutional responsibility was even more 
pronounced in coverage of the Geoghan case and its aftermath in 
Boston.  A January 2002 article in The Boston Globe, entitled “Church 
Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years,” is typical:  
  
Again, the focus in all of these examples is on the failure of Church 
officials rather than on the offending priest. 
Now, as Geoghan faces the first of two criminal trials next 
week, details about his sexual compulsion are likely to be 
overshadowed by a question that many Catholics find even 
more troubling: Why did it take a succession of three 
cardinals and many bishops thirty-four years to place 
children out of Geoghan’s reach?52
Television coverage was also dominated by the theme of the 
Church’s institutional responsibility.  On a June Nightline program, 
Koppel lectured Minneapolis Archbishop Harry Flynn, chairman of 
the USCCB’s ad hoc committee on sexual abuse, about the feelings 
of American Catholics about the scandal:  
  
The disappointment, Your Excellency, if I may suggest, it 
seems to be not so much about the behavior of the priests 
themselves—of course there is great anger about that—
but about the failure of the establishment of the American 
Catholic—of the Catholic Church in America to do 
something about it.53




Aside from this anecdotal evidence, there is some statistical 
support for the predominance of the institutional responsibility 
frame.  A LexisNexis search of news stories in The New York Times on 
clergy sexual abuse in 1993, during intensive coverage of a number 
of cases around the country sparked by the Porter case, found 





 51. 60 Minutes: The Archbishop; Coverup by Roman Catholic Church of Pedophilia by 
its Priests (CBS television broadcast Mar. 21, 1993). 
  A similar search for 2002 during media coverage of the 
 52. Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, THE BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2002, at A1. 
 53. Nightline: The Sins of the Fathers: A National Accounting (ABC television 
broadcast June 11, 2002). 
 54. Id.  
 55. I used the search terms “date is 1993 and (priest or clergy w/15 abus! or 
moles!) and (bishop or archbishop or cardinal) and not substance or alcohol or 
drug or military or ‘human rights’ or spouse or husband or army or guerillas or 
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Geoghan and other cases found reference to the role of Bishops in 
488 of 604 articles (81%).56
B. Litigation Documents as Credible News Sources 
 
A second reason why plaintiffs’ frame of institutional failure 
was adopted by media coverage of clergy sexual abuse is that 
journalists relied on litigation documents as news sources.57  
Journalists rely on sources to provide information and to promote 
the credibility of their stories.  Sources that are themselves 
perceived as credible are especially attractive to journalists.  Hence, 
news stories commonly quote official documents.58
Media coverage of clergy sexual abuse relied heavily on 
litigation documents as primary sources for news stories.  One 
regularly finds news stories based on pleadings, depositions, 
discovery documents, and trial transcripts.  Reporter Barry 
Yeoman’s initial print coverage of the Gauthe litigation in the Times 
of Acadiana was based almost entirely on the plaintiffs’ pleadings.  
In an interview, Yeoman recalled that his coverage was “written 
almost entirely from pleadings as a way to give the community a 
sense that we were just reporting the facts, rather than inflaming 
passions.”
 
59  Reporter John Pope’s subsequent story in the New 
Orleans Times Picayune was based on and quoted extensively from 
depositions that were filed by plaintiffs’ attorney Simon precisely in 
order to put them into the public record and make them accessible 
to the press.60
 
labor” to generate the first figure. To generate the second figure I used the 
following search terms: “date is 1993 and (priest or clergy w/15 abus! or moles!) 
and not substance or alcohol or drug or military or ‘human rights’ or spouse or 
husband or army or guerillas or labor”.  For both, I excluded articles that were not 
on topic, and I did not count articles that appeared more than once in the search 
results (last searched Aug. 15, 2006). 
  In an interview, Pope suggested that he was merely 
 56. See supra note 55 (determined by using the same search methodology but 
changing the year to 2002). 
 57. See, e.g., Lytton, Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation, supra note 1, at 835 (citing 
Pope, supra note 47) (describing journalist’s use of depositions taken by plaintiffs’ 
counsel). 
 58. See SCHUDSON, supra note 33, at 54 (stating that “news is . . . official and 
dependent on legitimate public sources . . . .”); see generally, TUCHMAN, supra note 
32, at 84–90 (discussing how sources and facts are used by reporters to create 
credibility for assertions). 
 59. Telephone Interview with Barry Yeoman, Writer, Times of Acadiana, in 
Albany, N.Y. (Jan. 12, 2005). 
 60. Lytton, Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation, supra note 1, at 835 (citing Pope, 
supra note 47); see also SIMON, supra note 10, at 146 (describing how plaintiff’s 
12
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reporting what he found in the public record.  You just go out and 
“see what you find,” he explained, “you don’t go into a story with 
an idée fixe.”61  Of his heavy reliance on the depositions, he said: “it 
is sworn testimony, testimony under oath, not just someone on the 
street talking about vague details.  You want information that you 
feel you can take to the bank.”62
One finds frequent reliance on litigation documents and 
proceedings in later coverage as well.  For example, The Boston 
Globe’s first article on the Porter case relied heavily on a demand 
letter written to the diocese by plaintiffs’ attorney, Roderick 
MacLeish, Jr., on behalf of a group of nine victims.
 
63  The Boston 
Globe’s Pulitzer Prize–winning coverage of clergy sexual abuse in 
2002 was based largely on sealed court files in the Geoghan case 
that the paper successfully litigated to have unsealed.64
A LexisNexis search of news stories in The New York Times on 
clergy sexual abuse in 1993, found explicit reference to litigation 
documents or proceedings in 22 out of 44 articles (50%).
 
65  A 
similar search for 2002 found explicit mention of litigation 
documents or proceedings in 312 out of 692 articles (45%).66
The leading books on the clergy sex abuse scandal—all by 
  
These figures under-represent reliance on litigation as a news 
source because they include only stories that explicitly mention 
litigation documents or proceedings. 
 
counsel put the victim’s deposition into the public record in order to get other 
victims from the country to come forward with other allegations of clergy sexual 
abuse). 
 61. Lytton, Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation, supra note 1, at 835 (quoting 
Telephone Interview with John Pope, Writer, New Orleans Times Picayune, in 
Albany, N.Y. (Jan. 6, 2005)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Alison Bass, Nine Allege Priest Abused Them, Threaten to Sue Church, THE 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 8, 1992, at 1. 
 64. See INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL, supra note 23, at 
262. 
 65. I used the search terms “date is 1993 and (priest or clergy w/15 abus! or 
moles!) and (lawsuit! or plaintiff! or court! or pleading! or deposition! or 
testimon! or discovery or trial!) and not substance or alcohol or drug or military or 
“human rights” or spouse or husband or army or guerillas or labor” to generate 
the first figure and “date is 1993 and (priest or clergy w/15 abus! or moles!) and 
not substance or alcohol or drug or military or “human rights” or spouse or 
husband or army or guerillas or labor” to generate the second figure.  For both, I 
did not count articles that appeared more than once in the search results (last 
searched Aug. 9, 2005). 
 66. I used the same search methodology as supra note 55, changing the year 
to 2002 (last searched Sept. 28, 2006).  
13
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journalists—also rely heavily on litigation documents.  Jason Berry 
states in the introduction to Lead Us Not Into Temptation, “Civil 
lawsuits provided the documentation on most of the cases I wrote 
about.”67 He calls these cases “the baseline on which I built my 
reporting,”68 and discloses in the prologue, “My primary sources 
were transcripts of civil testimony given under oath by bishops and 
priests in lawsuits across the country.”69  In their book Gospel of 
Shame, New York Times reporter Frank Bruni and freelance journalist 
Elinor Burkett acknowledge “J. Minos Simon, who actually let us 
take three fifty-pound boxes of his files to a hotel room for the 
weekend.”70  The notes to their book suggest that they relied most 
heavily on news reports of the cases that they covered, which were 
themselves largely based on litigation documents.71  The 
Investigative Staff of The Boston Globe, who won a Pulitzer Prize for 
their coverage of the scandal, explains in the notes to their book 
Betrayal that they relied heavily “on a large number of Church 
documents filed in connection with criminal and civil court 
cases.”72  David France, who covered the story for Newsweek 
magazine, states in the notes to his book Our Fathers, “My key 
resource for this book was tens of thousands of pages of court 
documents . . . [especially] the extensive record of court 
depositions.”73
C. Litigation as an Unfolding Drama 
 
In the news production process, a news story with continuity, 
that unfolds over time and can be released in episodes, is 
considered more newsworthy.74
 
 67. JASON BERRY, LEAD US NOT INTO TEMPTATION: CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND THE 
SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN ix (2000). 
  Such an ongoing story is said in 
 68. BERRY, supra note 7, at 47. 
 69. BERRY, supra note 67, at xxii. 
 70. BURKETT & BRUNI, supra note 18, at viii. 
 71. See, e.g., BURKETT & BRUNI, supra note 18, at 269 n.142. 
 72. THE INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, supra note 23, at 262. The 
Globe’s 2002 coverage was sparked by the filing of claims against Fr. Geoghan; see 
Michael Rezendes, Scandal: The Boston Globe and Sexual Abuse in the Catholic Church, 
in SIN AGAINST THE INNOCENTS: SEXUAL ABUSE BY PRIESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH 1, 4 (2004). 
 73. DAVID FRANCE, OUR FATHERS: THE SECRET LIFE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN 
AN AGE OF SCANDAL 599 (2004). 
 74. See SCHUDSON, supra note 33, at 180 (comparing one hit wonders with 
stories that generate subsequent articles).  Cf. Galtung & Ruge, supra note 34, at 53 
(explaining that a story chronicling the death of one soldier during a battle where 
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news jargon to “have legs.”75
The litigation process gave the clergy sex abuse story legs 
because it generated a steady flow of litigation events that each 
provided new revelations and pegs for news stories.  In the Gauthe 
litigation, for example, the filing of pleadings, the taking of 
depositions, hearings on motions, trial events, appeals, and 
settlements all gave rise to media stories.
  The protracted and dramatic nature 
of the litigation process lends litigation frames continuity and 
enhances their newsworthiness.  This provides a third explanation 
for the influence of tort litigation on media coverage of clergy 
sexual abuse. 
76
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR TORT REFORM AND CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
  In this manner, 
subsequent lawsuits like the Porter and Geoghan cases have 
supported ongoing coverage of clergy sexual abuse for over twenty-
five years. 
Having highlighted three features of tort litigation that explain 
the dominance of plaintiffs’ framing of clergy sexual abuse as a 
problem of institutional failure in media coverage, I conclude with 
a brief mention of two implications of this analysis.   
First, framing is one significant benefit of tort litigation that is 
underappreciated in the current debate over tort reform.  Tort 
reform advocates argue that tort litigation is largely frivolous and 
wasteful and that it produces perverse regulatory outcomes.77
 
many are killed would make little sense unless newspapers were published every 
minute).  
  They 
allege that rampant litigation and inflated jury awards constitute a 
major drain on society’s resources, and they assert that widespread 
fear of liability created by the tort system leads to the withdrawal of 
 75. See SCHUDSON, supra note 33, at 180. 
 76. See, e.g., Jason Berry, Church Accepts Liability, TIMES OF ACADIANA, July 18, 
1985, at 16 (citing stipulation of church liability); David McCormick, Church On 
Trial For Allegedly Harboring Priest in Sex Abuse Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 3, 1986 
(citing jury selection); David McCormick, Mother: Faith Shattered After Son Molested by 
Priest, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 4, 1986 (citing trial testimony); Dave Milner, Decision 
Reached in Priest Sex Suit, THE BATON ROUGE MORNING ADVOC., Feb. 8, 1986, at B1 
(citing jury verdict); Pope, supra note 47, at A1 (citing depositions); Staff, Sex Abuse 
Damage Trial Goes to Jury Today, THE DAILY ADVERTISER (Lafayette, La.), Feb. 7, 1986 
(citing submission to jury); Yeoman, supra note 46, at 17 (citing pleadings). 
 77. See CATHERINE CRIER, THE CASE AGAINST LAWYERS: HOW LAWYERS, 
POLITICIANS, AND BUREAUCRATS HAVE TURNED THE LAW INTO AN INSTRUMENT OF 
TYRANNY—AND WHAT WE AS CITIZENS HAVE TO DO ABOUT IT  60 (2002) (pointing out 
that twenty years passed before airbags were approved).  
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essential products and services and stifles safety innovation.78  They 
suggest that the litigation process in particular—pleading, 
discovery, and trial—is an ineffective and inefficient means to 
achieve the purported goals of the tort system of compensating 
injury victims and deterring wrongful behavior.79
Second, and perhaps even more significant, clergy sexual 
abuse litigation against the Catholic Church has led to the 
understanding of child sexual abuse in other institutional settings 
as a problem of institutional failure. There is, perhaps, no better 
example of this than the Congressional page scandal in the fall of 
2006.
  As this analysis of 
clergy sexual abuse litigation has shown, however, the tort litigation 
process can highlight institutional failures that give rise to social 
problems and direct the attention of policymakers toward 
institutional reform.  Before we undertake to curtail the litigation 
process, we would be wise to consider more carefully the ways in 
which it can promote better policymaking. 
80  On September 30, The New York Times ran a front page story 
below the fold entitled “Lawmaker Quits over E-Mail Sent to 
Teenage Pages” that reported Florida Congressman Mark Foley’s 
resignation in the face of reports that he had sent sexually explicit 
email messages to Congressional pages in 2005.81
 
 78. See id. at 12 (positing that the decline of medical specialists is a 
consequence of medical malpractice insurance costs). 
  Four days later, 
 79. See id. at 21 (explaining that assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence are decreasing in prevalence while joint and several liability is 
increasing); PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD: HOW 
AMERICA’S LAWSUIT CULTURE UNDERMINES OUR FREEDOM 57–62 (2001) (explaining 
the importance of judicial standards); PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL 
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 11–14 (1988) (suggesting the new tort system 
will settle for a wealthy defendant when no careless defendant exists); see also 
WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE 
THREATENS AMERICA’S RULE OF LAW 295–97 (2003) (discussing the somewhat unfair 
retroactive laws targeting tobacco companies’ past practices).  These critics also 
claim that private lawsuits are meant to resolve private disputes, not to make 
public policy.  In the American constitutional scheme, they assert policymaking is 
a task for elected legislatures, not common law courts.  I have addressed these 
claims in Timothy D. Lytton, Using Litigation to Make Public Health Policy: Theoretical 
and Empirical Challenges in Assessing Product Liability, Tobacco, and Gun Litigation, 32 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 556, 558–59 (2004), by suggesting that litigation is a 
complement to public policy. 
 80. For an excellent analysis of the relationship between the clergy sexual 
abuse scandal and the Congressional page scandal, see Marci Hamilton, 
Congressman Mark Foley’s Disgrace and Resignation: What Congress Should Have 
Learned—And Didn’t—From the Catholic Church Clergy Abuse Scandal, Oct. 5, 2006, 
available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20061005.html. 
 81. Kate Zernike & Abby Goodnough,  Lawmaker Quits over E-Mail Sent to 
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the story made it to the top of the front page and was now about 
the failure of Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert to take action 
against Foley earlier.82  The headline, “Hastert Fights to Save His 
Job in Page Scandal,” reflects how easily a story, which prior to 
clergy sexual abuse litigation would have been confined to the 
misconduct of a single Congressman, was cast in the now familiar 
frame of institutional failure and managerial responsibility.  The 
story continued inside the A-section with a large chart that detailed 
what Hastert knew and when he knew it.  The Op-Ed page ran an 
essay by a former page, now a law professor, outlining institutional 
reforms to improve oversight of the page program.83  For those who 
missed the obvious influence of the clergy sexual abuse scandal on 
the framing of the Congressional page scandal, the Sunday Week in 
Review section printed a cartoon depicting Hastert dressed as a 
bishop whispering to an aide wearing a Roman collar, “We 
should’ve just moved Foley to another Parish.”84
 
Teenage Pages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at A1. 
 
 82. Carl Hulse & Jeff Zeleny, Hastert Fights to Save His Job in Page Scandal, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2006, at A1.  
 83. Jonathan Turley, Op-Ed., Get Congress Out of the Page Business, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 4, 2006, at A31. 
 84. Mike Peters, Cartoonist Group, Oct. 8, 2006, available at http://www
.cartoonistsgroup.com/store/add.php?iid=14898 (last visited Sept. 26, 2009). 
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